Board evaluation · Malaysia edition
Framework and methodology for Malaysian listed companies
Aligned with the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance.
Our approach
There is no single right way to run a board. There is only the right way for your company, its shareholders and its strategy, and most boards have never consciously chosen it.
The Malaysian Code asks boards to comprehend, apply and report, and to explain any alternative they choose. That is a call for judgment, not box-ticking. Our evaluation is built the same way.
How it works differently
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Principles set the minimum standards
Integrity, independence where it matters, fair treatment of minority shareholders, sound related-party controls and honest reporting are not negotiable. We confirm them against the Code and the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements.
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Values set the dial
Above the minimum standards, every governance choice is a trade-off. Close alignment with a controlling or government-linked shareholder brings patient capital and speed, but can sideline minorities. Consensus builds unity but slows decisions.
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Three positions on every dial
Where the board believes it sits (stated), where the evidence puts it (observed), and where its strategy and shareholder structure need it to be (needed). The gaps between them are the real issues.
The question is not have we applied the practices? but are we governing the way we intend, and the way the company needs?
Additional dials for Malaysian companies
| Dial | Turn left: gain; risk | Turn right: gain; risk |
|---|---|---|
| State and policy alignment to Commercial independence (government-linked companies and GLIC shareholders) | Patient capital and alignment with national objectives; mixed mandates, appointments that are not merit-based | Commercial discipline and market confidence; friction with state shareholders |
| Controlling-shareholder alignment to Minority protection (family and founder groups, related-party transactions) | Long-term stewardship and speed; minorities sidelined, related-party risk | Market confidence and a fair deal for minorities; friction with the controlling family or parent |
| Sustainability as reporting to Sustainability as strategy | Compliant disclosure at low cost; risks and opportunities missed | Sustainability built into strategy, risk and pay; demands board time and capability |
Alignment with the Malaysian Code and Listing Requirements
| Expectation | How the review responds |
|---|---|
| Annual board evaluation; large companies to engage independent experts at least every three years, with forward-looking evaluations and no vague disclosure of method and outcomes (MCCG 2021) | The full evaluation is designed to serve as that independent review, with a disclosure summary for the CG Report that explains method, findings and actions |
| Chair separate from the CEO, and the chair not sitting on the audit, nomination or remuneration committees (MCCG 2021) | Leadership dial; check against minimum standards |
| Independent directors: at least half the board; a two-tier shareholder vote to retain an independent director beyond nine years (MCCG 2021); a 12-year cap on independent director tenure (Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements) | Continuity vs renewal dial; tenure and succession review |
| At least 30% women directors (MCCG 2021), with measurable diversity targets | Composition dial; check against minimum standards |
| Board and senior management responsible for sustainability governance; evaluations to cover how material sustainability risks and opportunities are addressed (MCCG 2021) | Sustainability dial; review of board papers and performance measures |
| Audit committee: a three-year cooling-off period for former audit partners; assessment of the external auditor using its transparency report (MCCG 2021) | Check against minimum standards |
“Large companies” are those in the FTSE Bursa Malaysia Top 100 Index or with a market capitalization of RM2 billion or more. The Securities Commission is preparing a revised code (MCCG 2026), expected to focus on board quality and effectiveness; this framework will be updated when it is issued.
How the review runs
About 6–10 weeks.
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Week 1
Scope with the chair
Agree objectives, interviewees, documents and the dials that matter most, including whether the review is to serve as the independent evaluation large companies are expected to commission every three years.
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Weeks 1–3
Desktop review
Constitution and board charter, minutes, board papers, limits of authority, the CG Report and CG Overview Statement, related-party transaction procedures, past board evaluations.
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Weeks 2–3
Dial questionnaire
Each director places the board on each dial: where it is now, and where it should be.
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Weeks 3–6
Interviews and observation
Individual interviews with every director, including nominee directors of major shareholders, the company secretary and key executives; observation of one board meeting. Interviews in English, with Bahasa Malaysia support where needed.
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Weeks 6–8
Analysis and dial profile
Stated, observed and needed positions on every dial; check against minimum standards in the MCCG and Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements; findings by category.
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Weeks 8–10
Report and board lab
Chair preview, written report, and a half-day session to decide which dials to turn.
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6–12 months
Follow-up
Check progress on agreed changes and refresh the dial profile.
Read in context
Deference, to a respected chair or to the nominee of a controlling or government-linked shareholder, can make a board efficient or silence it. The review reads the harmony vs challenge dial in its Malaysian context rather than against a Western benchmark, and pays particular attention to how nominee directors balance their duty to the company with the interests of the shareholder that appointed them.
Deliverables
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01
A one-page dial profile
The eight headline dials, showing the stated, observed and needed positions on each.
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02
Findings by category
And what they mean.
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03
Results of the check against minimum standards
Against the MCCG and the Listing Requirements.
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04
Recommendations in three tiers
Quick improvements, structural changes, and deliberate “dial adjustments”.
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05
Feedback to the chair
And to individual directors if wished.
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06
A disclosure summary
For the CG Report and CG Overview Statement.
Why Konigsburg & Co.
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Independent
No search business and no audit conflict, which matters when the Code expects a genuinely independent evaluation.
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Inside knowledge of the standards
From many years’ work at the OECD, ICGN and ACGA.
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Regional perspective
Experience in Singapore and Southeast Asia, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada.
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Consistent senior involvement
The person who conducts the interviews writes the report and leads the session.